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Broadcasters used to depend on fairly simple revenue streams. Until the 1980s, public broadcasters 
derived income from government subsidies or a license fee. In some countries, this was complemented 
with advertising revenues as well. When private broadcasters entered European broadcasting markets, a 
dual „order‟ emerged in which public broadcasters‟ funding model remained fairly the same and private 
broadcasters depended nearly solely on advertising revenues (Donders, 2010; Michalis, 2007). 
Today, Internet and telecommunications players are entering broadcasting markets. Essentially, this 
means that the market has to be divided between many players – previously active in separate markets. 
Consequently, broadcasters feel the need to diversify revenues. The strive after diversification became 
apparent most obviously in the United States where so-called „cable wars‟ between, among others, 
Time Warner Cable and Fox dominated the debates on a „fair‟ revenue sharing model between 
broadcasters and distributors. Indeed, Fox‟s Rupert Murdoch (2009) stressed: 
   
“We will be seeking retransmission dollars from our distributors. Asking cable 
companies and other distribution partners to pay a small portion of the profits they make 
by reselling broadcast channels, the most-watched channels on their systems, will help to 
ensure the health of the over-the-air industry in America. We realise this is going to be a 
tough challenge, but we’re determined to take a leadership position in creating an 
economic template for the future.” (emphasis added) 
 
Eventually, Fox and Time Warner Cable reached an agreement in 2010. Although the contents of 
the agreement are confidential, it is said that the retransmission fee agreed to Fox amounts to nearly $1 
per subscriber per month (Pepitone, 2010). Paradoxically perhaps, Murdoch‟s BSkyB platform has 
consistently argued against the payment of retransmission fees in the United Kingdom, as was stressed 
by BBC Director-General Mark Thompson in a speech at the MacTaggart lectures.
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Whereas battles in the United States take epic forms, being plaid in public, tensions between 
broadcasters and distributors are on the rise in Europe as well. In, among others, Flanders, the 
Netherlands, Hungary, Romania and Germany, broadcasters have indicated that they will be seeking 
(more) „retransmission Euros‟ from cable and other distribution platforms (e.g. Dziadul, 2010; RTL 
Group and Subsidiaries, 2010).  
The question at the core of this paper is on which issues distributors and broadcasters are divided 
and whether points of disagreement are merely centering on financial issues. In other words, are these 
battles all about money or are there more structural imbalances in the market that necessitate 
government intervention? And what may be the consequences of these looming business battles for the 
online television market? These questions are highly topical as the market for online content is likely to 
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grow even harder in the next years. Additionally, European policy-makers will be confronted by the 
pernicious effects on competition, access and diversity issues in the market that are the result of 
economic power play related to platforms for television content. Moreover, and more related to the 
scientific relevance of the paper, the issue has rarely been addressed in research. The paper aims to fill 
this gap and to stimulate similar research. 
The paper starts with an elaboration of the shifting business roles in the broadcasting sector and its 
implications. Consequently, the possible points of disagreement between broadcasters and distributors 
are discussed and analyzed. The focus is on Flanders (i.e. the northern part of Belgium) and Denmark – 
two comparable cases in terms of market size, cable penetration, presence of a powerful public 
broadcaster, being subject to European regulation, etc. The issues addressed in the paper involve the 
transmission fees paid by distributors to broadcasters, the distribution cost broadcasters pay to 
distributors, flexible viewing, on-demand services, premium content and copyrights. Eventually, these 
issues will lead to a discussion of Internet television business and the implications for broadcasters and 
distribution platforms. Finally, conclusions and recommendations for policy-makers and the sector 
itself are outlined. 
The paper is based on a project that was carried out in 2010 and commissioned by SBS Belgium 
(also see Donders & Evens, 2010). The paper is based on the triangulation of sources, drawing, first, 
from literature in communications, law, political sciences and economics; second, from a document 
analysis (including media decrees, press releases, official statistics and formal company statements); 
and, third, from interviews with academics and representatives from media companies and regulators. 
In total, twenty-two experts in Denmark and Flanders were interviewed between August and October 
2010. 
 
Change and power play in the broadcasting industry 
 
Partly thanks to the liberalization of the European broadcasting and telecommunications markets, the 
ongoing digitization wave, the rapid emergence of the Internet as a worldwide distribution platform, 
and the spectacular increase in processing capacity, the three - previously separated - industrial 
domains of media, telecommunications and informatics merged into a converged electronic 
communications sector. These developments have profoundly affected industry architectures and 
business models deployed within the converged media ecosystem and may lead to a fundamental 
transformation of existing media industries (Küng, Picard & Towse, 2008). Increasingly, electronic 
communications markets are characterized by the emergence of multi-sided platforms, which function 
as a gatekeeper of control and value (Ballon, 2007). Both software and hardware platforms are 
considered structuring building blocks in the fluid ecosystem and affiliate complementary products, 
technologies and services around a central platform infrastructure (Gawer, 2009). Eventually, these 
platforms compete for platform leadership to become and control an „ecosystem of innovation‟ that 
gains importance as more users adopt the platform and its components (Gawer & Cusumano, 2002). 
Gatekeepers can derive a dominant position within the value network from controlling essential 
platform functionalities, referred to as competitive bottlenecks. Bottlenecks relate to scarce and critical 
resources, and often relate to access issues of essential facilities (network infrastructure) but also end-
user services (user interfaces, operating systems etc.). As Poel & Hawkins (2001) contend, analysis of 
access issues in bottleneck environments should take into account the commercial relation of the access 
provider with both service providers and end-users. 
Also in broadcasting, technological innovation might threaten the traditional models of creating and 
capturing value while a quest for platform leadership has emerged, which may reshuffle existing power 
configurations in the industry (Evens, 2010). This digitization of broadcasting may increase sources of 
uncertainty and the level of risk for the expanding number of players in the industry (Chalaby & Segell, 
1999). Given the successful launch of digital television platforms in an increasing number of countries, 
especially telecommunication operators have positioned themselves in the centre of the broadcasting 
market. Distributors not only select television channels, but also bundle them in thematic packages 
enriched with value-added services on their platforms (e.g. video-on-demand and interactive services) 
and position channels in the electronic programming guide, which may affect their audience reach and 
the latter‟s performance. This gatekeeper role allows platforms to determine the financial and practical 
terms of distribution, and may – in some cases – lead to the abuse of market power. In case 
broadcasters cannot enter into agreement with leading platforms, broadcasters could be prevented from 
accessing their audiences and restricted entry to a large proportion of the broadcasting market (e.g. 
Callanan, 2004; Colapinto & Prario, 2010). As platform operators are involved in several business 
roles, this may arise serious conflicts of interest. Increasingly, distributors are evolving to vertically 
integrated media companies with stakes in content production. Although this content is mainly used to 
build a strong position in the distribution platform market, this might cause tensions with traditional 
broadcasters, considering this move as an important threat to their business model. In addition, studies 
(e.g. Chen & Waterman, 2007; Waterman & Choi, 2010) show that platform operators may 
discriminate against non-affiliated content providers and limit access of competing platforms to must-
have content they control vertically. 
Traditional cable operators at their turn feel threatened by the success of online video platforms, 
which provide the consumer with direct and unlimited access to a wide variety of content. According to 
Schuh (2010), these over-the-top television services create more value than the traditional distributors 
thanks to their „find, play and share‟ approach, providing users with more search and recommendation 
possibilities and social features than conventional distribution platforms. The audiovisual market is 
further destabilized by the emergence of IP-connected devices and the growing importance of 
consumer electronics providers, which are keen to control access to the audiences and play a central 
role in the customer relationship. Hardware manufacturers have initiated IP-connected equipment 
allowing content providers to bypass traditional content aggregators and establish a direct-to-consumer 
relationship (Suárez Candel, 2010). The provision of content and related services can occur according 
to a platform-controlled walled garden model or in a more „open‟ environment (e.g. Chesbrough, 2006; 
West, 2003; West & Mace, 2010).  
Obviously, what is currently at stake in the broadcasting industry is the tough struggle for platform 
leadership and customer relationship. Traditional distribution platforms will need to secure their role as 
main suppliers of content and related services by building a multi-tenant platform; otherwise they face 
the risk being reduced from gatekeepers to connectivity providers while suffering the „dumb pipe‟ 
syndrome. To date, traditional broadcasting platforms still enjoy their powerful gatekeeper function. 
 
Table 1: Television distribution market (Q4 2010)(C: cable, I: IPTV, S: satellite, T: terrestrial) 
FLANDERS DENMARK 
Operator Market share Operator Market share 
Telenet (C) 84,9% YouSee (C) 56,7% 
Belgacom (I) 12,1% Canal Digital (S) 14,6% 
TV Vlaanderen (S) 2,9% Viasat (S-I) 10,5% 
Mobistar (S) 0,1% Telia Stofa (C-I) 9,1% 
  Boxer (T) 2,5% 
  TDC TV (I) 5,4% 
  Dansk Brëdband (I) 1,3% 
 
In the remaining part of the paper, the focus will mainly be on the relationship and tension between 
distributors and broadcasters in Flanders and Demark. With both markets having a relatively high level 
of cable penetration (ca. 99% in Flanders and 66% in Denmark), cable operators take a central role in 
the distribution of television programming. In terms of connected subscribers, Telenet has built a quasi-
monopoly in the Flemish broadcasting market by gradually swallowing up all the regional distributors. 
Although this market position has been challenged by the IPTV supply of Belgian telecommunications 
incumbent Belgacom and recently by the decision of the telecommunications and media regulators 
(respectively BIPT and VRM) to open access to the cable network, the company still has a comfortable 
position (De Marez et al., 2008; Donders & Evens, 2010). In Denmark, YouSee, a fully owned 
subsidiary of incumbent TDC, controls the audiovisual market and has also been forced to open up its 
network for wholesale access by telecom regular NITA (Svendsen, 2010). Given their high market 
share and cable penetration, both Telenet and YouSee have become the only realistic opportunity of 
entry in the television industry, giving both companies considerable market power vis-à-vis 
broadcasters. Not only this gatekeeper role, but also their financial resources lead to a power 
asymmetry. Since telecommunications is a much more profitable business than broadcasting, 
distributors report turnover and profit figures that outweigh those of broadcasters multiple times. Still, 
when analyzing the platforms‟ relationship with broadcasters, a different approach between Telenet 
and YouSee can be identified with regard to several domains. 
 
Retransmission fees and distribution costs 
 
Financial streams between broadcasters and distributors are among the most hidden secrets (being 
subject to confidentiality clauses) as well as contested issues in the broadcasting industry. The dispute 
is related to the payment of retransmission fees (i.e. platforms compensate broadcasters for the 
distribution of their content) and the payment of transport and distribution costs (i.e. broadcasters pay 
distributors for carriage on their networks). The situation in Flanders and Denmark, however, greatly 




In Flanders, agreements on retransmission fees and distribution costs are part of bilateral contracts 
between broadcasters and distributors. These contracts – subject to confidentiality clauses – take as 
many forms as the amount of broadcasters in the market. Derived from the interviews, four main 
models were identified depending on the type of channel. It should be mentioned that all the models 
below only concern the distribution by cable infrastructure. For DSL, broadcasters have made other 
arrangements as all of them do not pay for distribution and transport. However, this might change, as 
the existing deals are to be re-negotiated in the near future. 
 
(1) First, the public broadcaster, which enjoys a must-carry status, is not charged for distribution 
while receiving – albeit not strictu sensu – a retransmission fee. The latter is subject of an 
agreement to exploit the author rights through retransmission. 
(2) For foreign (both public and private) broadcasters, a similar approach is upheld. They do not 
pay any distribution costs, while receiving compensation from platforms in exchange for their 
distribution, however. This might seem somewhat bizarre as these broadcasters do not 
generate a lot of traffic to the distributors‟ networks, but they are needed in high-value 
proposition of platforms. Yet, since these broadcasters have no real interest in being 
distributed, distributors are in the weaker negotiation position. 
(3) A third model exists for the private generalist broadcasters that target the local market. In 
general, these pay distribution costs for the distribution of analogue channels (up to €600,000 
per channel per year), but also receive a retransmission fee, complemented with advertising 
spending by distributors. Contracts between these private broadcasters and distributors are 
more complex than with public and foreign broadcasters, as several financial flows (including, 
for example, advertising deals) between the two parties are concerned. 
(4) A final model applies to private niche broadcasters, who have limited research but nonetheless 
target interesting demographic profiles. In most cases, these small broadcasters are charged 
for distribution without receiving a retransmission fee. Some niche channels with considerable 
audience research, however, receive a fee per subscriber. 
 
The local-based broadcasters increasingly oppose these current arrangements, notably with the 
cable operator, and this for several reasons. First, discussions go about the level of retransmission fee 
paid. The generalist broadcasters consider the current compensation for the exploitation of their content 
too low given the traffic they generate to the platform (the three main broadcasting groups generate 
about eighty percent of all audience traffic). In addition, the origin of the payments is being questioned. 
As the cable operator charges consumers for author rights contributions and consequently transfers 
them to the broadcasters, the cable company is not paying the retransmission fees itself. Third, some 
broadcasters argue that the diverse ways of dealing with retransmission fees and distribution costs 
show the cable operator‟s discriminatory behaviour. It remains unclear on what basis distribution costs 
and retransmission fees are determined. Platforms counter-argue by saying the remuneration of 
broadcasters is already well above the European average, a statement that could not be checked due to 
the lack of accessible data. Therefore, broadcasters and regulators have demanded more transparency 
regarding these contracts. Despite all the complaints about the distribution arrangements, the net 
balance between retransmission fee and distribution cost is positive for most domestic broadcasters. 
 In reaction to these complaints, the cable operator has proposed a new matrix model according to 
which retransmission fees would be calculated on the basis of the overall market shares of all the 
channels. Although some broadcasters argue that this model reduces discriminatory treatment and 
brings more transparency as it is based on an objective parameter, most opinions are highly sceptical, 
however. Apart from the fact that most broadcasters contend that the model is not sufficiently 
rewarding them for the retransmission of their contents, others claim that retransmission fees should be 
based on multiple criteria supplementary to overall audience figures, including audience reach within 
the target group, local employment, investment in domestic content, etc. A model taking into account 
these criteria would result in a more balanced assessment of the economic and cultural value of a 
particular channel and would ultimately result in a better compensation for domestic broadcasters and 




As a result of the proliferation of (niche) broadcasters in recent years, the Danish broadcasting market 
has become saturated. As the high amount of channels can hardly be financed through the rather small 
investments in television advertising, broadcasters have been looking for new and stable sources of 
income in order to reduce their dependence on advertising revenues. Broadcasters have moved towards 
pay-television channels aimed at catering niche interests alongside their main channels. Consequently, 
Denmark has a high level of consumer payments providing broad financing to platform operators. 
Television channels are bundled in bouquets, including basic, medium and full packages, which are 
mostly organised in a buy-through according to which “lovers of roses are forced to buy violets, 
daisies and lilies as well” (Hultén, 2006: 59). This system allows broadcasters to supplement “revenue 
from an increasingly splintered and competitive advertising market with subscription fees and 
distribution revenues” (see Harrie, 2009: 173). By charging consumers for accessing television 
programming, may-carry broadcasters can finance themselves with retransmission fees in addition to 
advertising revenues. These retransmission fees have been an essential feature of private broadcasters‟ 
business models for many years now in Denmark (as well as in most Scandinavian markets). In fact, 
this hybrid business model consists of several layers. 
First, the distributors do not charge broadcasters for distribution. Instead, cable and other platform 
operators share their subscription revenues with the broadcasters, who get paid a monthly per-
subscriber fee. Broadcasters that are included in the basic package benefit from a quasi-full reach of the 
population and get more income from distribution compared to those included in the top-level 
packages. The channels are remunerated via minimum guarantees and fees depending on the popularity 
and the bargaining power of the broadcaster. Depending on the channel, these fees vary between €0.5 
and 2 per subscriber per month for the right to distribute and market a given television channel. For 
most private stations, these distribution fees are an essential source of income in order to avoid deficits 
from broadcasting operations. Whereas in Flanders retransmission fees amount up to four percent of 
the overall turnover of broadcasters, distribution revenues mount up to about thirty percent of overall 
revenues for Danish broadcasting groups. Although there seem to be fewer conflicts between 
distributors and broadcasters, broadcasters‟ enduring desire to receive more income from distribution is 
a potential future source of conflicts and may a threat to this model. 
In addition to distribution fees, platforms also pay the collecting societies for the exploitation of 
broadcasters‟ rights. This exploitation is limited to the simultaneous, unaltered and unabridged 
retransmission for reception by the public (Foged, 2009). Operators then pay a remuneration based on a 
monthly per-subscriber tariff, set by the Copyright License Tribunal, which vary between €0.5 and 4. 
These fees are alike for all distribution platforms and are thus no subject to any negotiation. For public 
broadcasters, distributors enter into agreement with the Union of Broadcasting Organisations (UBO), 
which gives consent to the distributors on behalf of all the Scandinavian public broadcasters. For 
private broadcasters, the remuneration for author rights is directly transferred to Copydan Kabel TV 
and KODA. 
 
Comfort services  
 
With digital television, consumers can access and view television programming in a more flexible way. 
Platforms have launched so-called „comfort services‟ allowing consumers to record programmes, 
watch it delayed and eventually skip advertising, either from the set-top box, computer or smart phone. 
Needless to say that broadcasters fear these technological innovations as they threat their current 
advertising-based business models. Especially in Flanders, where broadcasters still mainly rely on 
advertising revenues, this evolution is considered a bigger threat for their business model compared to 
Danish broadcasting companies. 
In Flanders, cable operator Telenet offers „flex viewing‟ for a monthly price of €8 per subscriber. 
Therefore, consumers have to rent a „Digicorder‟ enabling them to record, pause and fast forward 
programmes. Previously, consumers were allowed to purchase a Digicorder for which Telenet had to 
pay author rights‟ contributions to collecting societies, as is the case for most electronic devices. Now 
that consumers only rent the receiving equipment, no such payment is required and the cable operator 
captures all income. The broadcasters contest this practice on two grounds. First, broadcasters claim 
that distributors are in fact disturbing the traditional broadcasting model – based on fixed schedules 
aimed at maximising audience reach and capturing advertising revenues – while not compensating 
them for the traffic they generate. 
 
“We offer a television evening: a series of programmes interrupted by commercials. That 
is our product, and not one programme. What they are doing now is destroying that 
product.” (Peter Quaeghebeur, Director-General VMMa, in Decaestecker, 2010, authors‟ 
own translation) 
 
The argument continues in saying that comfort services are only successful because of the available 
content of broadcasters. Without this branded content, consumers would have little incentives to pay €8 
per month for flexible viewing. Second, broadcasters allege the current practice is illegal as platforms 
only have the rights to retransmit programmes in a simultaneous, unaltered and unabridged manner. 
Allegedly, comfort services go beyond such a primary retransmission. Hence, a new contract has to be 
negotiated, extending remuneration from primary retransmission to comfort services as well. The 
operators disagree, arguing that broadcasters are unwilling to accept technological progress.  
Also in Denmark, broadcasters have argued that new interactive services fell out of the scope of the 
existing copyright agreements and therefore argued that these new exploitation modes required new 
remuneration systems. In contrast to Flanders, this legal dispute was settled in Denmark, where a one-
stop-shop system has been introduced for television services offered outside the framework of 
simultaneous, unaltered and unabridged transmission. In order to facilitate and stimulate innovation in 
the media sector, Denmark was the first country to introduce an extended collective licensing scheme, 
in which all the necessary author rights and related rights are included. Consequently, operators 
YouSee and Stofa entered into such an „all rights included‟ licensing scheme with UBO for launching 
the „Start Over‟ service (allowing consumers to record, fast-forward, rewind and pause programmes – 
albeit that programme trailers and commercials cannot be skipped) (Foged, 2010). 
 
Video-on-demand services  
 
Another possible point of contention between operators and broadcasters concerns the revenue-sharing 
model applied for video-on-demand services. For video-on-demand services, including movies and 
series, distributors have their own catalogue – also online and accessible through smart phones and 
other portable devices.
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 In addition, nearly every broadcaster has built an interactive library of catch-up 
television and archival programs. Consumers can subscribe to these services or enter into pay-per-
view. Catch-up services are operated on a revenue-sharing basis between broadcasters and distributors. 
In a generalizing fashion, revenues are split between the operator, broadcaster, and collecting societies. 
This revenue-sharing model does not pose major problems for most broadcasters although, in Flanders, 
some broadcasters complain about the limited flexibility of price setting and, moreover, are somewhat 
disappointed with the limited uptake (and thus payments) by the television consumers. The less 
contentious nature of revenue sharing for video-on-demand services is mainly due to its relatively 
modest share of broadcasters‟ and operators‟ revenues so far. Indeed, revenues from this service are 
rising, but as foreseen not booming at all. Together with the increasing penetration of digital television, 
conflicts between broadcasters and platform operators concerning these issues are likely to intensify. 
The most problematic aspect of video-on-demand services is actually not its underlying revenue-
sharing model, but rather potentially conflicting interests between broadcasters and distributors. As 
some distributors become involved in content aggregation and in some cases also content production, 
this may arise conflicts of interests. This concern can be illustrated, pointing at the Flemish cable 
operator‟s plans to launch a „Hot from the US‟ service, offering consumers the opportunity to watch 
series like Lost, Grey‟s Anatomy and Desperate Housewives only 48 hours after their first screening in 
the United States and, hence, before screening by broadcasters in Flanders. The latter protested fiercely 
against this move and Telenet withdrew its plans, stressing it should have consulted its partners in the 
Flemish media industry as they also had contributed to the growth of digital television in Flanders 
(Baltussen, 2009). 
Another example of a service that might provoke conflicts between distributors and broadcasters in 
both Flanders and Denmark is the supply of movies-on-demand. Some broadcasters have argued that 
they also consider offering movies-on-demand. After acquiring the linear rights for a movie, non-linear 
rights might come at a discount. However, operators tend to buy the non-linear rights for movies in 
bulk. Here, consensus might be more easily achievable as operators and broadcasters can also here 
engage in a revenue-sharing model, with broadcasters advertising for movies-on-demand and both 




Rather than on prices, platform operators in Flanders compete on the provision of premium content. 
Hence, the leading distributors are involved in several business roles. They do not only take care of 
network management and content transmission, but also engage in content aggregation and content 
production, offering company-owned broadcast channels or specific premium packages. While Telenet 
purchased the Flemish branch of pay television Canal+, Belgacom acquired the exclusive rights of the 
Belgian football league. Premium content allows these operators to differentiate from competing 
platforms and functions as unique selling proposition to viewers. Although the operators argue that 
their specialist pay-television channels cater for niche interests and are no competitor for established 
broadcasters, both operators have started to launch also digital thematic channels in cooperation with 
local production houses. These channels do not directly compete with the generalist broadcasters, but 
are a real threat for digital thematic channels that focus on specific target groups. Telenet started, for 
example, a kids channel (with Studio100), which competes for market share with similar initiatives set 
up by the public broadcaster and the leading private broadcaster. It is fair to say that some of these 
thematic channels are far from successful and have failed to realize profits.  
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 For example, cable operator Telenet enables consumers to access content on a variety of devices. See 
http://yelo.yelo.be/wat-is-yelo.  
Several stakeholders fear that the combination of the different distributors‟ business roles being a 
gatekeeper, content aggregator and content producer at the same time might lead to conflicts of interest 
and abuse of market power, resulting in discriminatory treatment of non-affiliated program suppliers. 
As the operators select, package and position channels, it is possible that platform operators are 
reluctant to offer good distribution conditions to channels that directly compete with one of their 
channels. In worst case, the operator can decide to withdraw it in order to protect its own content. If, 
for example, a sports channel wants to enter the market, it needs a distribution agreement to get its 
programs to the viewers. The question then raises whether an operator is willing to provide access to a 
channel that has the potential to cannibalize its own content and under what conditions the carriage will 
occur. In Flanders, several rather small broadcasters complain about this platforms‟ bottleneck and 
contend that they are blackmailed to accept poor distribution conditions although such accusations are 
hard to proof and verify. As the cable operator holds a market share of about eighty percent, channels 
are completely subject to the obligingness of the quasi-monopolist, which enjoys significant horizontal 
market power. 
As market shares of distribution platforms are more distributed among several players, the situation 
in Denmark is slightly different. Despite the lack of cross-ownership regulations and despite the mutual 
dependence, broadcasting and distribution somehow remain separated businesses. No distribution 
company operates a television station, except for satellite provider Viasat, which has stakes in the TV3 
network. Because of their independence from content providers, Boxer was granted a 12-year license 
for managing the digital terrestrial television network. In the past, cable operator YouSee tried, but 
failed, to establish a sports channel. To date, YouSee shows no interest to enter the content industry, 
except for providing video-on-demand services (in cooperation with domestic broadcasters). Instead of 
holding broadcasters, the company says to prefer establishing a strong relationship with all major 
content providers that is based on trust and respect. Nevertheless, it is often argued that YouSee holds 
an „indirect ownership‟ of channels as its market share allows for a strong bargaining power vis-à-vis 
the broadcasters that are keen for distribution. 
The ownership of its own programming provides satellite operator Viasat with greater leverage in 
distribution. By exclusively offering its TV3 network in non-cable areas, the satellite platform aims at 
foreclosing the satellite platform market. By controlling the distribution of TV3 channels, which have 
high customer appeal thanks to its sports rights, Viasat aims to lure consumers from other platforms to 
its own platform. Viasat and its competitor Boxer could not agree upon the distribution of TV3 giving 
the terrestrial platform a disadvantage in terms of programming variety. After years of disagreement, 
an agreement was reached with competing satellite platform Canal Digital to distribute TV3 only 
within antenna communities. There had been serious concerns that Viasat would withdraw its bouquet 
from all antenna communities that signed an agreement with Canal Digital. The deal now allows every 




Compared to traditional television markets, the Internet has nibbled the gatekeeper role of incumbent 
distributors as it provides content providers with a direct access to the end-consumer. As broadcasters 
are increasingly investing in online platforms as part of their Internet strategy, this move amplifies the 
need for innovative business strategies from competing incumbents in their attempt to counter or 
leverage the rising popularity of new market entrants (see Chan-Olmsted & Ha, 2003). This evolution 
may also affect the relationship between broadcasters and distributors, and might result into current 
market behavior being reproduced in the online environment. Regarding the topic discussed in this 
paper, two trends are unfolded in Internet television markets. 
First, traditional media players such as broadcasters and cable operators do no longer solely claim 
the delivery of television content. Instead, a new battlefield has emerged in which „new‟ entrants 
combat the „old‟ providers of television programs. A number of platforms and devices are successfully 
entering the market facilitating a shift from a more or less dual broadcasting system to a multi-player 
environment. As discussed previously, online platforms such as Hulu (a joint ABC, NBC and Fox 
initiative), Netflix (movie streaming), iTunes (movie downloading) and Amazon Video On Demand 
(movies and shows for rent or purchase) may lead to changing media usage while more hardware-
driven platforms might have a rather disruptive impact on the industry architecture and existing 
business models. IP-connected television platforms (Apple TV, Google TV, Roku, PlayStation 3, etc.) 
are keen to make agreements with content providers allowing them directly connect with the consumer 
and position themselves as the main gatekeepers in the industry. These services and platforms can be 
regarded as a substitute to the traditional distribution platforms and are therefore a threat to incumbent 
distribution companies. 
Second, as a result to the aforementioned threat, „old‟ players are eager to defend „their‟ historical 
grown market by deploying strategies for preserving market power, creating scarcity, and reinventing 
bottlenecks. As they fear that free and legal online video platforms like Hulu will cut into their revenue 
models, American cable operators Comcast and Time Warner Cable have joined forces and launched 
the „TV Everywhere‟ service. Increasingly, incumbent cable operators are confronted by „cord-cutting‟ 
whereby especially younger people tend to drop cable subscriptions and to connect with the Internet for 
watching television programs. With the TV Everywhere initiative, operators aim at convincing existing 
subscribers to pay more for premium content and to appeal to the on-demand-everywhere demands of 
next-generation viewers. Most broadcasting networks are inclined to offer their content through Time 
Warner Cable‟s and Comcast‟s platform, and are, in line with their offline strategies for broadcasting 
platforms, negotiating retransmission fees, which add to their revenues.  
The entrance of these cable operators on the Internet television market should be considered as a 
means of controlling access and content rather than being a disruptive innovation to the sector, and 
might affect the online content market in a negative way. The recent Comcast/NBC merger may 
challenge Hulu‟s bright future as it is not unthinkable that NBC would want to withdraw its programs 
from Hulu and similar platforms to protect Comcast‟s pay-television business while the latter has 
incentives to discriminate against non-affiliated content providers or restrict access to other online 
television platforms. The question then is whether policy intervention would be justified in some cases 
in order to protect the growth of Internet television services from market foreclosure. 
 
Conclusion and recommendations  
 
In this paper we investigated on which issues distributors and broadcasters are divided and whether 
points of disagreement are merely centering on financial issues. Notably, we observed a difference 
between the Danish and Flemish markets. Whereas conflicts between operators and broadcasters are 
very conflictive in Flanders, there seems to be an understanding between the two parties in Denmark. 
This shows that the idea of a cable war in Europe deserves some nuance and is, in spite of the single 
market, dependent on specific cultures and market structures in the EU‟s Member States or regions.  
There are three main points of contention. First, there are disputes about the level of retransmission 
fee being paid by operators to broadcasters. Second, broadcasters ask for remuneration for so-called 
comfort services, which go beyond the simultaneous, unabridged and unaltered distribution of their 
content. Third, facing competition from new competitors like Apple and Google, operators attempt to 
capture distribution on the „open‟ Internet as well, asking (i.e. forcing) broadcasters to offer content 
through their online portals. This adds a bottleneck to their entire platform network and will eventually 
increase broadcasters‟ dependence upon operators. The latter should be nuanced to some extent as both 
in Denmark and Flanders three to four broadcasters hold over eighty percent of market share. In spite 
of the power asymmetry between operators and broadcasters, the attachment to domestic content and 
ditto channels is an advantage to be exploited by broadcasters.  
Coming to the question what the consequences of the looming business battles between operators 
and broadcasters may be, a number of remarks can be made. First, in light of new – mainly – American 
competitors entering the market, European operators and broadcasters should realize that they have to 
make things work together. Broadcasters need operators for distribution, while vice versa distributors 
need the must-have content catered for by domestic broadcasters. In order to protect the European 
audiovisual industry from an American hegemony, both content providers and platform operators 
should join forces and establish a symbiotic relationship. Despite this common threat of American-
based platform leadership, policy intervention should be concerned about regulating the dominant 
position of competitive bottlenecks in distribution as they may harm competition, foreclose markets 
and have reverse effects on pluralism in the content sector. As cable systems are increasingly vertically 
integrated, this raises concerns that cable operators may exert a significant amount of market power. 
However, rather than vertical integration in cable systems, monopoly power in platform bottlenecks 
poses a real threat to competition in the program supply markets. Therefore, policy intervention should 
primarily focus on cable operators‟ horizontal market power obtained through significant market shares 
in platform bottlenecks. When content suppliers have different alternatives to connect with consumers, 
they gain more bargaining power vis-à-vis distribution platforms and can negotiate higher financial 
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